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INTRODUCTION 
The “central purpose” of the Fair Housing Act, according to the 
Supreme Court, is to “eradicate discriminatory practices” in the 
housing sector.1 The statute enables suit from “an aggrieved person.”2 
For decades, this meant that a suit could be brought by any plaintiff that 
claimed to have met the constitutional standing requirements, namely, 
“injury-in-fact.”3 In a recent case interpreting a different statutory 
provision, Thompson v. North American Stainless, the Supreme Court 
called this doctrine into question, signaling that the pool of eligible 
plaintiffs could be considerably narrowed in the future.4 Since that 
decision, lower courts have been sharply divided as to whether the 
Supreme Court effectively overruled Fair Housing Act standing 
doctrine.5 In Bank of America v. City of Miami, the Supreme Court 
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 1.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2511 (2015). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1988). 
 3.  Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); see also Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining injury-in-fact as “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent rather than 
conjectural or hypothetical”). 
 4.  Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
 5.  Compare, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo, 115 F. Supp. 39, 909, 917–18 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(holding that Thompson effectively overruled past Supreme Court interpretation of FHA 
statutory standing), with, e.g., City of L.A. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 2:14-cv-04168-ODW 
(RZx), 2014 WL 6453808, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (holding original interpretation of FHA 
statutory standing remained good law). 
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must decide whether to reconcile the interpretations of these statutory 
provisions or to retain the traditional broad conferral of standing under 
the Fair Housing Act. This commentary recommends that the Court 
reconcile these statutory provisions and cut back on the traditional 
broad conferral of standing. However, this commentary argues that the 
City of Miami still has standing to bring its claim under that narrower 
conferral. 
I. FACTS 
On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami, Florida (“the City”) 
brought suit against Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Bank of America (“the 
Banks”)6 under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).7 The City alleged that 
since 2004, the Banks have continually flooded “minority communities 
with high cost and other ‘predatory’ loans, allegedly constituting 
‘reverse redlining.’”8 Further, the City alleged that this practice “caused 
an excessive and disproportionately high number of foreclosures on 
[the Banks’] loans in the minority neighborhoods of Miami.”9 The City 
sought an injunction, a declaratory judgment, attorneys’ fees, punitive 
damages,10 and damages for the: 
significant, direct, and continuing financial harm to the City . . . based 
on reduced property tax revenues based on: (a) the decreased value 
of the vacant properties themselves; and (b) the decreased value of 
properties surrounding the vacant properties . . . [and] damages 
based on the expenditures of municipal services that have been and 
will be required to remedy the blight and unsafe and dangerous 
conditions which exist at vacant properties that were foreclosed as 
a result of [the Banks’] illegal lending practices.11 
 
 
 6.  Although the cases were substantially similar, they were all brought separately. See City 
of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp. (Bank of America), 800 F.3d 1262, 1263 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015). They 
were resolved in the same way by both the District and Appellate courts, have been consolidated 
and will be heard together by the Supreme Court. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, (Bank 
of Am.Corp.) 136 S. Ct. 2544 (2016), cert. granted 84 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. June 28, 2016) (No. 15-
1111). 
 7.  City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp. (Miami I), No. 13-24506-CIV., 2014 WL 3362348 at 
*6–7 (S.D. Fl. July 9, 2014). The City also brought an unjust enrichment claim, which was 
dismissed without prejudice. Id. This claim, however, was not brought up on appeal and is outside 
the scope of this commentary.  
 8.  Id. at 1; see also id. at 3 (“Reverse redlining is the practice of extending mortgage credit 
on exploitive terms to minority borrowers.”).  
 9.  Id.   
 10.  Bank of America, 800 F.3d at 1269. 
 11.  Miami I, 2014 WL 3362348 at *2.  
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To buttress its claims, the City attached a statistical analysis and 
statements from confidential witnesses;12 the City’s hedonic regression 
analysis allegedly could quantify those losses attributable to each 
individual bank’s conduct.13 This analysis purported to show, for 
example, “that an African-American [Bank of America] borrower was 
1.581 times more likely to receive a predatory loan than a white 
borrower, and a Latino borrower was 2.807 times more likely to receive 
such a loan.”14 The confidential witness statements claimed that the 
Banks deliberately targeted black and Latino borrowers for predatory 
loans.15 
The district court dismissed the City’s claim with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).16 The court reasoned that the City did not have statutory 
standing under the Fair Housing Act and that the Banks’ conduct did 
not proximately cause the City’s injuries.17 The court further reasoned 
that the City’s claim did not fall under the “zone of interests” protected 
by the Fair Housing Act.18 The court relied on Eleventh Circuit 
precedent, Nasser v. City of Homewood,19 which limited standing under 
the Fair Housing Act to those plaintiffs that “possess ‘rights granted’ by 
the Fair Housing Act,”20 specifically, plaintiffs that plead damages that 
are “somehow affected by a racial interest.”21 
The City moved for reconsideration and for leave to file an 
amended complaint, arguing that it had standing under the FHA.22 The 
proposed amended complaint alleged that the Banks’ discriminatory 
lending practices “frustrate[] the City’s longstanding and active interest 
in promoting fair housing and securing the benefits of an integrated 
community,” thereby “directly interfer[ing]” with one of the City’s 
missions.23 It also made more detailed allegations about properties that 
had been foreclosed upon after being subject to discriminatory loans.24 
 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Bank of America, 800 F.3d at 1269.  
 14.  Id. at 1268. 
 15.  Id. at 1269. 
 16.  Miami I, 2014 WL 3362348 at *3. The district court also dismissed the action on 
proximate cause and statute of limitations grounds. Id. at *6.  
 17.  Id. at *3, 5.  
 18.  Id. at *3–4.  
 19.  671 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 20.  Miami I, 2014 WL 3362348 at *3–4. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Bank of America, 800 F.3d at 1271. 
 23.  Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint at 31, Miami I, 2014 WL 3362348). 
 24.  Id.  
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The district court denied the City’s motion for reconsideration and for 
leave to amend.25 The court was unpersuaded by the City’s new 
argument that it “has a generalized non-economic interest . . . in racial 
diversity,” ruling that these were “claims [the City] never made and 
amendments it did not previously raise or offer despite ample 
opportunity,” and were therefore “improperly raised as grounds for 
reconsideration.”26 Finally, the court noted that these “generalized 
allegations [do not] appear to be connected in any meaningful way to 
the purported loss of tax revenue and increase in municipal expenses 
allegedly caused by Defendants’ lending practices.”27 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the FHA “to eradicate discriminatory practices” 
in the real estate market.28 “Recognizing that persistent racial 
segregation had left predominantly black inner cities surrounded by 
mostly white suburbs, the Act addresse[d] the denial of housing 
opportunities on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.”29 
The FHA provides that “[a]n aggrieved person may commence a 
civil action . . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to [] 
discriminatory housing practice[s] or breach.”30 It defines an 
“aggrieved person” as anyone who “claims to have been injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice,” or “believes that such person will be 
injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”31 
Whether a plaintiff can bring suit under such a statutory cause of 
action involves a two-pronged analysis: the plaintiff must have both 
constitutional and statutory standing. The first prong, constitutional 
standing, is a mandatory inquiry in all federal court cases and 
determines if a court has the power to adjudicate a case.32 The Article 
III injury requirement is merely “an injury in fact that is concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent.”33 The second prong, statutory 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (quoting City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., (Miami II) No. 13-24506-CIV., 2014 
WL 4441368, at *2 (Sept. 8, 2014)). 
 27.  Id. (quoting Miami II, 2014 WL 4441368 at *2 n.1). 
 28.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2511 (2015). 
 29.  Id. at 2510. 
 30.  42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). 
 31.  Id. at § 3602(i).  
 32.  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 33.  Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally id. at 562–71 (noting that 
constitutional standing also requires causation and redressability, neither of which are at issue 
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standing, exists if a plaintiff “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought 
to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the 
legal basis for his complaint.”34 Statutory standing analysis is actually a 
determination of whether a cause of action for the plaintiff exists under 
the statute.35 The “zone of interests” requirement applies to all 
statutory causes of action.36 The breadth of the “zone of interests,” 
however, varies by statute, as Congress can expand the scope of the 
zone if it does so expressly.37 
The Supreme Court’s early cases on the issue construed FHA 
standing as broadly as possible under Article III. First, in Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance,38 a black tenant and a white tenant of a 
single apartment complex sued their landlord for racial discrimination 
in renting practice, alleging damage from loss of “the social benefits of 
living in an integrated community.”39 The Court held that this injury 
was sufficient for standing, because “[FHA standing is] as broad[] as is 
permitted by Article III of the Constitution . . . insofar as tenants of the 
same housing unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned.”40 
Later, in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,41 the Village of 
Bellwood brought suit under the FHA against two real estate firms, 
alleging the firms “steered” black and white homeowners into targeted, 
race-specific neighborhoods, thereby “manipulat[ing] the housing 
market,” “affecting the village’s racial composition,” and causing “[a] 
significant reduction in property values.”42 The Court held that “[i]f, as 
alleged, petitioners’ sales practices actually have begun to rob 
Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the village has standing to 
challenge the legality of that conduct.”43 Further, the Court held that 
“‘[t]here can be no question about the importance’ to a community of 
‘promoting stable, racially integrated housing.’”44 The Court also 
reaffirmed that FHA statutory standing “is as broad as is permitted by 
 
here). 
 34.  Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177–78 (2011) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)). 
 35.  City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1276 (2015); Lexmark Int. v. Static 
Control Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–87, 1387 n.4 (2014).  
 36.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 39.  Id. at 208. 
 40.  Id. at 209. 
 41.  441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 42.  Id. at 109–10.  
 43.  Id. at 110–11. 
 44.  Id. at 111 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Tp., 431 U.S. 85, 94, 97 (1977)). 
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Article III of the Constitution.”45 Three years later, in Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman,46 a nonprofit organization brought suit against a 
realty firm for racial steering.47 The Court reaffirmed that standing 
reaches to the extent of Article III and held that the organization’s 
claim that racial steering “perceptibly impaired [its] ability to provide 
counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-income 
homeseekers” constituted injury-in-fact and, therefore, was sufficient 
for standing.48 Congress revisited and amended the FHA in 1988.49 The 
amended bill adopts substantially similar empowering language to, 
according to the House Report, “reaffirm the broad holdings of 
Gladstone and Havens.”50 
In a 2011 Title VII case, Thompson v. North American Stainless,51 
the Supreme Court called into question the broad language in 
Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens. In Thompson, a recently 
terminated employee brought suit under Title VII alleging that he was 
terminated in retaliation after his fiancée, who worked for the same 
employer, filed a gender discrimination charge against the employer.52 
The employee argued that Title VII allowed suit in the same way the 
FHA did.53 The Court had earlier connected Title VII and the FHA in 
Trafficante, where it supported its FHA holding by referencing the 
broad interpretation the Third Circuit had given to the similar 
empowering language in Title VII.54 In Thompson, however, the Court 
renounced this broad interpretation of Title VII as inviting “absurd 
consequences.”55 Instead, the Court determined that Title VII’s “zone 
of interests” is consistent with the longstanding interpretation of 
another statute with similar “aggrieved” language—the Administrative 
 
 45.  Id. at 109. 
 46.  455 U.S. 363 (1982).  
 47.  Id. at 368. 
 48.  Id. at 372, 379. 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
 50.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 17 (1988).  
 51.  562 U.S. 170 (2011).  
 52.  Id. at 170.  
 53.  Id. at 176.  
 54.  Id.; compare Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (authorizing suit from “an 
aggrieved person.”) with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (“A civil action may be 
brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . .”). See also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 
409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (explaining that Title VII shows “a congressional intention to define 
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution”). 
 55.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176–77 (“For example, a shareholder would be able to sue a 
company for firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he could 
show that the value of his stock decreased as a consequence.”). 
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Procedure Act (APA),56 holding that both statutes enable suit by any 
plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the 
statute,” while excluding “plaintiffs who might technically be injured in 
an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory 
prohibitions in Title VII.”57 Under this analysis, a suit cannot stand “if 
the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with 
the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be 
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”58 The Court held 
that Title VII covered Thompson’s suit, as “the purpose of Title VII is 
to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions . . . [and] 
Thompson is not an accidental victim of the retaliation[;] . . . hurting 
him was the unlawful act by which the employer punished [his 
fiancée].”59 
The Court further reinforced the connection between Title VII and 
FHA standing, discussing that the holdings of Trafficante, Gladstone, 
and Havens also did not require standing at its utmost extent, because 
the injuries to the plaintiffs in those cases fell within the “zone of 
interests” as construed under the APA.60 Additionally, the Court 
reinforced this connection by declining to follow a suggested 
interpretation of the standing requirement in Title VII on the grounds 
that such an interpretation would contradict the Trafficante holding.61 
This connection could signal that the Court is ready to apply the 
Thompson analysis to the FHA and restrict FHA standing to a 
narrower “zone of interests” inquiry. 
III. HOLDING 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal, 
“[b]ecause the district court imposed too stringent a zone of interests 
test and wrongly applied the proximate cause analysis[.]”62 Instead, the 
Eleventh Circuit “f[ound] that the City has constitutional standing to 
pursue its FHA claims” and that “the ‘zone of interests’ for the Fair 
 
 56.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551  et seq (2012); compare 5 U.S.C. § 702, 
(authorizing suit by any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a 
relevant statute”) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“A civil action can be brought . . . by the person 
claiming to be aggrieved.”). 
 57.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 175–78 (quoting Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank 
& Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)).  
 58.  Id. at 178 (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n., 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987)). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 176.  
 61.  Id. at 177.  
 62.  City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1267 (2015). 
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Housing Act extends as broadly as permitted under Article III of the 
Constitution, and therefore encompasses the City’s claim.”63 Finally, it 
allowed the City to remedy its statute of limitations issues by amending 
its original complaint.64 The court declined, however, to evaluate the 
amended complaint without first giving the district court the 
opportunity to do so.65 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioners, the Banks, argue that the Fair Housing Act, like Title 
VII under Thompson, imposes greater restrictions than Article III 
injury-in-fact alone, and instead only enables suit by plaintiffs that fall 
within its “zone of interests.”66 Further, the Banks argue that because 
of the similar language, timeframe, and purpose67 of the statutes, the 
“zone of interests” implicated in each statute is similar,68 and that, 
consistent with Thompson, the “zone of interests” test “enabl[es] suit 
by any Plaintiff with an interest arguably sought to be protected by the 
statute, while excluding Plaintiffs who might technically be injured in 
an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory 
prohibitions in Title VII.”69 
B.  Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent, the City of Miami, concedes that after the Court’s 
Thompson analysis, statutory standing under the Fair Housing Act may 
not, as previously had been decided, “extend to the full limits of Article 
III,” yet argues that it does encompass the City’s claim in this case.70 
The City claims that its complaint, especially as amended, satisfies the 
 
 63.  Id. at 1266. The court acknowledged the incongruence between the FHA precedent and 
Thompson, but was still bound by the FHA holdings without explicit Supreme Court decisions to 
the contrary. Id. at 1277. 
 64.  Id. at 1284. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Brief for Petitioners at 12–13, Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 136 S. Ct. 2544 
(2007) (No. 15-1111) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 67.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 
(2015) (stating the purpose of both statutes is to “eradicate discriminatory practices within a 
sector of the Nation’s economy”). 
 68.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 66, at 13–15.  
 69.  Id. at 14 (quoting Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 70.  Brief of Respondent at 19–20, Bank of Am. Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2544 (No. 15-1111) 
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. 
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Petitioner’s test; it pleads sufficient injury to its “interest in non-
discrimination.”71 Respondent further argues that the 1988 
amendments to the Fair Housing Act codify the Court’s past 
precedent.72 Finally, Respondent argues that the Thompson holding 
does not necessarily limit the Fair Housing Act because the two statutes 
are different. 73 
V. ANALYSIS 
First, the Court should limit standing under the FHA so that it is 
coextensive with similar statutes. Second, the Court should hold that 
Respondent, the City of Miami, has standing under that standard. 
A.  Standing Under the FHA Is Equivalent to Standing Under Title VII 
or the APA. 
An analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Thompson shows that the 
FHA’s empowering language should be construed the same way as 
Title VII. First, the Court has shown special willingness to interpret 
“aggrieved” language similarly across statutes. Second, in making that 
determination, the Court has been willing to overlook large differences 
in the underlying statutes. Third, the Court kept Thompson within FHA 
standing doctrine. And finally, the same rationale for limiting Title VII 
standing applies to the FHA. 
The Court has shown special willingness to interpret “aggrieved” 
language similarly across statutes.74 Despite the adage that “identical 
language may convey varying content when used in different 
statutes,”75 the Thompson decision largely ignored the differences in 
Title VII and the APA.76 Instead, the Court relied primarily on the 
statutes’ similar language.77 Here, it is likely that the Court will analyze 
the “aggrieved” language similarly under the FHA. 
 
 71.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 70, at 21 (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 66, at 
28). 
 72.  Id. at 22–27. 
 73.  Id. at 28.  
 74.  See supra text accompanying notes 56, 60–61.  
 75.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015).  
 76.  Compare Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) (“One purpose [of the 
Administrative Procedure Act] was to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and 
standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had 
departed widely from each other.”) with Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (stating the purpose of Title VII was to eliminate 
discriminatory practices in employment). 
 77.  See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176–77 (2011). 
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Additionally, the Court’s willingness to overlook the differences 
between the APA and Title VII in Thompson signifies that the 
differences between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act are not 
sufficient to justify varying the interpretation of the “zone of interests.” 
Stated differently, the operative question is not: “how different are Title 
VII and the FHA?”78 Instead, the question is: “is Title VII less different 
from the FHA than Title VII is from the APA?” The answer to this 
question is a resounding “yes.” Both Title VII and the Fair Housing Act 
are provisions of the Civil Rights Act,79 both have been amended 
relatively recently,80 and both have the similar purpose of “eradicat[ing] 
discriminatory practices within a sector of the [n]ation’s economy.”81 
Further, the Court’s insistence on keeping the Title VII analysis 
from straying from past FHA holdings reveals intent to construe the 
statutes similarly. The Court could have avoided any connection 
between Title VII and FHA by merely stating: “we decline to follow 
the dicta in Trafficante, despite the similar empowering language of the 
statutes, both have different purposes, amendment history, etc.” Its 
failure to do so suggests that the statutes are not sufficiently different 
to justify interpreting them differently.  
Similarly, the Court must have meant for Title VII and the FHA to 
have the same “zone of interests” analysis, because otherwise it had no 
reason to go to such lengths in Thompson to assure that its 
determination of who constitutes a “person aggrieved” was “fully 
consistent with [its] application of the term in Trafficante.”82 First, 
Thompson was a Title VII case; any discussion of the Fair Housing Act 
was therefore not determinative. Second, the Court could have merely 
determined that the analysis was not equivalent under the two statutes 
and avoided the unnecessary discussion altogether. That it did not do  
 
 
 78.  Certainly, the statutes are different in important respects. For example, the Fair Housing 
Act states its purpose explicitly: “to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Title VII lacks such broad purpose language. 
See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). One of the primary purposes of the 1988 FHA amendments was to 
strengthen the private enforcement mechanism of the statute, thus the amendments contain 
specific reference to the “broad holdings” of Trafficante and Havens. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1988). Title VII’s 1991 amendments make no such reference to 
Hackett v. Mcguire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (11th Cir. 1971), which referenced the broad holdings 
of Title VII and was cited in Trafficante.  
 79.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176.  
 80.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 81.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff., 135 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 82.  See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 177. 
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this shows that its language served a different purpose—to lay the 
groundwork for reading the “zone of interests” test into the FHA. 
Finally, similar absurd consequences to those that concerned the 
Court in Thompson could follow if the FHA is interpreted to be as 
broad as Article III permits. For example, the Court discussed how it 
would be absurd if a shareholder were allowed to sue for diminution of 
stock value after a corporation violated Title VII. Similarly, if the FHA 
requires only broad constitutional standing, a shareholder would be 
allowed to sue a real estate firm for the diminution of its stock if it 
occurred as a result of the firm’s discriminatory renting practices.83 
B. The City Is Still Aggrieved Within the FHA Zone of Interests.
The “zone of interests” test is not stringent, and the Court has
shown a willingness to allow suit in close cases. First, the Court only 
requires an injury that is arguably within the zone of interests “to 
indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.”84 It bars 
suits only “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”85 
Additionally, the Court may be inclined to view the scope of the 
“purposes implicit in the statute” broadly; for example, the Court has 
previously defined the purpose of Title VII as “eradicating 
discriminatory practices within [employment].”86 In Thompson, 
however, while applying the test, the Court announced that “the 
purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ 
unlawful actions.”87 This change in formulation is important: the earlier 
formulation emphasizes the discrimination itself and therefore does 
not necessarily contain Thompson’s complaint, while the latter 
formulation does so unequivocally. 
Finally, the conferral of standing in Gladstone provides a close 
analogy to how the Court should decide the present case. The Court in 
Thompson went to great lengths to ensure that the FHA holdings were 
83.  See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 177.
84.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014).
85.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178 (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Ind. Ass’n., 479 U.S. 388, 399
(1987)). 
86.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff., 135 S. Ct. at 2511. 
87.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178.
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consistent with the new “zone of interests” test.88 So, the best place to 
look for an analogy is within those cases. In Gladstone, a municipality 
alleged that it: 
had been injured by having its housing market wrongfully 
manipulated to the economic and social detriment of its citizens and 
that the individual respondents had been denied their right to select 
housing without regard to race and had been deprived of the social 
and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.89 
Both the municipality and the individual respondents were held to 
have standing. The Court held that “[i]f, as alleged, petitioners’ sales 
practices actually have begun to rob Bellwood of its racial balance and 
stability, the village has standing to challenge the legality of that 
conduct,”90 and that “‘[t]here can be no question about the importance’ 
to a community of ‘promoting stable, racially integrated 
housing.’”91 The injuries to Bellwood and the City of Miami in this case 
are indistinguishable.92 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that the City has alleged injury within the 
Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interests” and allow the merits of the case 
to be heard. 
 
 
 88.  See id. at 177.  
 89.  Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 91 (1979). 
 90.  Id. at 111. 
 91.  Id. at 111 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977)). 
 92.  The Court could also remand the case, and allow the City leave to amend its complaint 
with greater information about how the discrimination itself has caused it injury. 
